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Disputants' Decision Control in
Court-Connected Mediation:
A Hollow Promise Without
Procedural Justice
Nancy A. Welsh*
I. INTRODUCTION

Professor Deborah Hensler suggests in the lead article of this Symposium issue
that the courts' embrace of facilitative, interest-based mediation may have been illconceived. She argues that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that litigants
are more satisfied with mediation than with adjudicative alternatives such as
arbitration and trial. She also urges that there is sufficient evidence to show that
litigants prefer processes that vest decision control in third parties. Both of these
assertions are subject to challenge,' but this Comment will focus upon the
significance of giving decision control to the disputants in consensual processes.
Using available research, this Comment will argue, perhaps surprisingly, that
the salience of the disputants' decision control is much more apparent to mediation
advocates and to courts than it is to disputants. Disputants involved in consensual

* Assistant Professor of Law and Associate Director, Center for Dispute Resolution, The Dickinson
School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University; B.A., magna cum laude, 1979, Allegheny
College; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1982. The author wishes to extend her thanks to Grace D'Alo,
Christopher Honeyrnan, and Bobbi McAdoo for their helpful comments and to Charles Kawas for his
research assistance.
1. A number of studies suggest that litigants prefer mediation (likely, but not clearly, defined as a
hybrid of facilitative and evaluative mediation) over trial or arbitration. See eg. Wayne Kobbervig,
Mediation of Civil Cases in Hennepin County: An Evaluation 23-26 (Minn. Judicial Center 1991)
(reporting that a greater percentage of the litigants whose cases were mediated perceived the process as
"fair" or "very fair" and described the process as "efficient" or "very efficient" than litigants whose cases
were arbitrated or adjudicated; also reporting that a greater percentage of litigants whose cases were
mediated perceived that they were given an adequate opportunity to express their views); Debra L.
Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three ProcessesUnderlying Judgments ofProceduralJustice:
A Field Study ofMediation and Arbitration,65 J.Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 1167, 1175 (1993) (finding that
in labor-management disputes, participants perceived greater process and decision control in mediation
than in arbitration). However, as Professor Hensler has noted, the majority of the studies comparing
mediation and adjudication arise in the areas of domestic relations and small claims. See e.g. Roselle
L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case
Characteristics,29 L. & Society Rev. 323,341,343 (1995) (observing that litigants who unsuccessfully
mediated and then adjudicated their cases evaluated their mediation sessions as fairer than the
subsequent trial and were twice as likely to say that they would prefer to mediate rather than adjudicate
future cases); Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A "PartySatisfaction" Perspectiveon a Comprehensive
Mediation Statute, 13 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 885, 890 n. 10, 891 n. 19 (1998) (describing research in
domestic relations, small claims, and victim-offender mediation programs showing greater satisfaction
with mediation than adjudication).
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processes often do not perceive themselves as wielding real control over the
outcomes achieved in those processes. Thus, the current practice of distinguishing
and prioritizing among dispute resolution processes based primarily upon the locus
of decision control may be misguided. Further, vesting decision control in the
disputants does not guarantee that the disputants will perceive the dispute resolution
process or its outcome as fair. To the contrary, the procedural justice literature
demonstrates that, regardless of their decision control, disputants consistently value
processes that feel fair because they offer a meaningful opportunity for voice and
consideration and assure even-handed, dignified treatment. The literature makes it
clear that disputants' perceptions of procedural fairness influence their perceptions
of outcome fairness. Indeed, disputants' perceptions of procedural fairness may
even influence their evaluation of their own control over outcomes. This suggests
that courts need to focus quite intently upon the institutionalization of third party
processes that are procedurally just, regardless of whether those processes are
classified as consensual or non-consensual.
Such a uniform commitment to procedural justice might seem natural for the
courts. However, the procedural due process jurisprudence indicates that the courts'
appreciation of procedural justice is unlikely to translate easily to processes in which
the disputants, not the courts, are deemed to exercise control over outcomes. Given
the current state of procedural due process jurisprudence, courts may lack both the
desire and the ability to demand procedural justice in third party processes that are
classified as "consensual." Ironically then, disputants' decision control, which is
meaningful to mediation advocates and the courts but a rather hollow promise for
disputants, may have the unfortunate effect of hindering the institutionalization of
procedural justice in consensual, court-connected processes.
II. DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF THE REALITY OF DISPUTANTS'
DECISION CONTROL IN CONSENSUAL PROCESSES
For many years, mediation advocates have argued that one of the most salient
features of mediation is the extent to which it permits disputants to retain control
over the outcome of their dispute (i.e. "decision control").2 Indeed, dispute
resolution textbooks3 and even court rules 4 categorize dispute resolution processes
according to their "consensual" or "non-consensual" qualities. The locus ofdecision

2. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision ofSelf-Determinationin Court-ConnectedMediation:
The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1 (2000) (examining selfdetermination, which is described as the fundamental principle underlying mediation). "Decision
control" is defined as "the extent to which disputants are free to accept or reject the result of a third-party
intervention." E. Allan Lind et al., Decision Control and Process Control Effects on Procedural
FairnessJudgments, 13 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 338, 339 (1983).
3. ' See e.g. Leonard L. Riskin & James E. Westbrook, Dispute Resolution and Lawyers, 1, 1-5 (2d
ed., West Group 1998) (categorizing dispute resolution processes as "adjudicative," "consensual," and
"mixed").
4. See e.g. Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 114 (1994) (distinguishing among facilitative, evaluative and
adjudicative processes).
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control apparently is very meaningful to those of us who study and teach in the field
of alternative dispute resolution or play the role of neutral third parties.' But
research in the area of procedural justice-supplemented here with some provocative
suggestions from in-depth interviews with mediation participants-raises questions
regarding the salience of decision control for many of the people who bring their
disputes to mediation.
Several years ago, Professor Hensler and other researchers conducted a study
involving personal injury litigants in three different state courts. The study
compared litigants' perceptions of the procedural justice provided by trial, courtconnected arbitration, judicial settlement conferences and traditional bilateral
negotiations (i.e., negotiations between the litigants' attorneys). One of the striking
findings in the study involves the litigants' perception of their decision control in the
settlement conferences and bilateral negotiations.6 The litigants apparently did not
perceive themselves as having any more control in these "consensual" processes than
in trial or in arbitration.' Indeed, the defendants perceived themselves as having less
control in settlement conferences than at trial.'
It seems self-evident that the litigants actually exercised the most direct decision

control in the bilateral negotiations between their attorneys and in the judicial
settlement conferences. There could be no settlement outcomes unless the clients

5. See Pauline Houlden ¢t al., Preferencefor Modes of DisputeResolution as a Function ofProcess
and Decision Control, 14 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol. 13, 26 (1978) (observing that "decision control
affected third-party preferences [among processes] more than it affected those of litigants ....Indeed,
only third parties believed that high rather than low third-party decision control would result in a fairer
procedure").
6.
The interview items included the following questions regarding outcome control and process
control: "How much control did you feel you had over the outcome of your case? Response options:
a great deal, some, a little, not much" and "Overall, thinking about your dealings with the court and with
your lawyer, how much control would you say you had over the way your case was handled? Response
options: a lot, some, a little, not much." E. Allan Lind et al., The Perception of Justice: Tort Litigants'
Views of Trial, Court-Annexed Arbitration,and JudicialSettlement Conferences 82 (RAND 1989).
7. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences
in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & Society Rev. 967, 993-94 (1990). See also Lind et al., supra n. 6,
at 69-70 (observing that litigants' perceptions of control over the outcome and the process "were
generally in the low to moderate range" and differentiating between plaintiffs and defendants). It is also
interesting to note that attorneys infrequently perceive their clients as exercising more control in the
consensual process of mediation than in the traditional litigation process. See e.g. Bobbi McAdoo, A
Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in
Minnesota, 25 Hamline L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 33-34) (on file with author)
(reporting that few attorneys perceived that mediation has the effect of "providing greater client
satisfaction" [26.1 percent] or "providing greater client control" (28.3 percent]); Bobbi McAdoo & Art
Hinshaw, Attorney Perspectiveson the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigationin Missouri:Supreme Court
ADR Committee Report 67 Mo. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 2002) (on file with author) (reporting that
minority of attorneys perceived that mediation has the effect of "providing greater client satisfaction"
[30 percent] or "providing client with a greater sense of control" [31.2 percent]).
8. Lind et al., supran. 6, at 69-70 (Plaintiffs' ratings were "rather moderate" for trial, arbitration and
settlement conferences while defendants' ratings of control were "especially low" for arbitration and
settlement conferences and "more moderate" for trial.).
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agreed to them.9 Yet, somehow, this responsibility did not translate into a perception
of substantial decision control. How could this be? The researchers suggested that
the litigants' perceptions of approximately the same degree of decision control in
both the consensual and non-consensual processes could be traced to their general
exclusion from the consensual processes, contrasted with their general inclusion in
the non-consensual processes."0 The researchers particularly speculated that the
defendants' perceptions of lack of control could be explained by the fact that they
"had been pulled into the legal process against their will, and because many of them
were represented by lawyers engaged by their insurance companies [and] few of
them could expect to exert much influence on the process or outcome.""
But what about disputants who are present and participate in consensual
processes? To what extent do they perceive their own decision control? Although
some have studied these questions in the context of small claims court,' 2 there is only
limited data regarding its application to the court-connected mediation of personal
injury, contract and other civil non-family cases. The studies that have been done
do not support the conclusion that disputants perceive themselves as wielding
decision "control," although in recent research, most disputants agreed that they had
lesser or greater degrees of "input in the development of the final outcome." 3
What is the source of this difference between mediation advocates' emphasis
upon disputants' decision control and the disputants' own more limited perceptions
of their control over the outcome? Recent post-mediation interviews with disputants
-- parents and school district representatives involved in the mediation of special

9. See ABA Model Rule Professional Responsibility 1.2 which provides: "A lawyer shall abide by
a client's decision concerning the objectives of representation .... A lawyer shall abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." ABA Model R. Prof. Resp. 1.2 (1983).
See also Rule 1.4, which requires a lawyer to "explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation." ABA Model R. Prof. Resp.
1.4 (1983).
10. Lind et al., supran. 7, at 963.
11. Lindetal.,supran.6,at7l.
12. See e.g. Wissler, supran. 1, at 345 n. 37 (observing that "the features of the [mediation] process
that contributed to evaluations of the process as fair and satisfying included..., marginally, providing
disputants with control over the outcome," but also noting that the analysis suggested "that outcome
control is related to procedural judgments through its relationship with other process characteristics ").
13. Roselle L. Wissler, An Evaluation ofthe Common PleasCourt Civil Pilot MediationProject4647 (Feb. 2000) (very few litigants perceived that they were significantly pressured by either the mediator
or the other party to settle; ninety-one percent of the litigants also perceived that they had "somewhat"
to "a great deal" of "input in determining the outcome;" twenty-eight percent of the total litigants
indicated that they had "somewhat" input while thirty-four percent indicated that they had "a great deal"
of input); Roselle Wissler, Court-ConnectedMediation in GeneralCivil Cases: What We Know From
EmpiricalResearch, 17 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. _ (forthcoming 2002) (observing that in court-connected
civil mediation programs in Ohio, sixty-three percent of litigants indicated that they had "considerable
input in determining the outcome" and that those litigants who reported speaking more during mediation
felt that they had more input in determining the outcome than litigants who spoke less). At the same
time, it is important to note that at least one study examining mediation and arbitration in the labormanagement context has found that disputants perceive greater control over outcome in mediation than
in arbitration. Shapiro & Brett, supra n. 1, at 1175.
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education disputes"' -- may offer some clues. In many of these interviews," the
parents flatly denied feeling that they had control over the outcome. Their
explanations for this perception varied. Most focused on their inability to control the
precise terms of any agreement: "I don't think I had control over the outcome though
....Yeah, I think I played a role, but I think... at any time, it could have went
[sic] any way."'" Others revealed great sensitivity to their (or their children's)
perceived vulnerability once they left the mediation session: "Iwas reminded several
times of what the school district could do. So to say that I felt that I had control over
it... no ....I mean.., the mediator himself said that... if this cannot be worked
out, then there could be a more segregated setting chosen by the school ....
Meaning I could not dictate to them what I needed."' 7 Finally, several explained
their perception of lack of control by highlighting the school district's failure to
develop new proposals responding to what the parent had revealed at the mediation:
"No I didn't [feel like I had control over the outcome] ...[b]ecause it's a decision
of the school district, those parties. And what mattered was their opinion, not
necessarily any documentation or examples which I had to share. I think that was
evidenced by the conversation that occurred."'"
School district representatives, in contrast to the parents, were more likely to
perceive their control over the outcome. One such representative observed, "I felt
that I could have gone another direction at any time. I could have either abandoned
the process or chosen to just take total responsibility for what was being requested.
I felt that I had a lot of freedom .....""t But even among the school district
representatives, particularly those who appeared eager to reach resolution, some did
not perceive that they wielded decision control: "No [I did not feel like I had control
over the outcome] ...[b]ecause if I would have had control, utter control, I would
have walked away with everything having been resolved."2
These comments from mediation participants hint that disputants may not
perceive themselves as clearly having control over the outcome in a negotiation or
mediation session because shared control does not feel like real control. Further,
their perception of decision control in the mediation session inevitably is affected by
their perception of the extent of their control over the situation outside the mediation
session. It has also been shown that disputants' feelings of control may be
constrained by their self-image, their learned norms of behavior toward others, or

14. Grace D'Alo and I conducted pre-mediation and post-mediation interviews with participants in
fourteen mediation sessions conducted in November-December, 2000 by the Pennsylvania Special
Education Mediation Service. Disputes over special education issues involve a complex area of law,
potentially significant equitable or monetary relief and continuing relationships. Thus, these cases offer
similarities to many of the contract and employment disputes brought to courts for resolution.
15.
All of the disputants interviewed after the mediation session, responded to the following
question: "Did you feel you had control over the outcome? Why or why not?"
16. Transcript of interview with parent, Case #4, at 1-2 (on file with author).
17. Transcript of interview with parent, Case #12, at 6 (on file with author).
18. Transcript of interview with parent, Case #14, at 2 (on file with author).
19. Transcript of interview with school district representative, Case #3, at 3 (on file with author).
20. Transcript of interview with school district representative, Case #2, at 4-5 (on file with author).
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their sense of what "good decent people"'" do in responding to conflict. Finally,
some of the comments from the special education mediation participants reveal that
disputants' perception of their decision control can be influenced by their perception
of whether the other side heard and considered what they had to say.
Mediation advocates cannot quickly assume that all (or even most) disputants
will feel confident in and protected by the simple knowledge that they control the
decision to settle or not to settle in mediation. Thus, mediation advocates may be
mistaken in relying so heavily upon the locus of decision control to distinguish
mediation from the non-consensual processes of arbitration or adjudication.' In
addition, mediation advocates may need to be wary of equating disputants' decision
control with a higher quality dispute resolution process. Instead, if mediation
advocates and the courts intend to make mediation feel qualitatively superior and
just, they must turn to the research regarding procedural justice. That literature
clearly highlights the need to focus on process characteristics, not decision control,
as the key to communicating procedural quality to disputants. This Comment will
now turn to a brief discussion of those characteristics and their relationship with
outcome control.

mH.

THE PRIMACY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE CONSIDERATIONS

Professor Hensler's assertion that the courts should abandon mediation (at least
facilitative, interest-based mediation) and instead direct their efforts toward the
institutionalization of processes in which a third party exercises decision control
overstates the importance of this form of control. Many studies reveal that
disputants care as much or more about the procedural justice offered by dispute
resolution processes than about decision control." Perceptions of procedural justice
influence disputants' perceptions of substantive justice,24 their compliance with the

21. Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept of
Dispute, 9 Just. Sys. J. 151, 176 (1984). Merry and Silbey urge that even people's choices of whether
or not to take disputes to court are made in the context of "norms about integrity, self-image, selfrespect, and duties to others which are neither calculated nor subjects of individual choice" and that"[aln
adequate analysis of conflict behavior must include both normative rules and pragmatic strategies." Id.
at 160. In the special education research project, one parent noted: "It's my personality to do for the
other person and I feel like I based my decisions on ...how I felt about the person." See Transcript of
interviews with parents supra nn. 16-18 (on file with author). See also Roderick Gilkey & Leonard
Greenhalgh, The Role of Personalityin Successful Negotiating,2 Negot. J. 245,255-56 (1986) (noting
that negotiators' locus of control-i.e., external locus or internal locus-affects both the extent of their
perceived control over what happens and their behaviors in negotiations).
22. Indeed, this reliance may reflect the "culture ofprofessional elites" in which there is an emphasis
upon "free choice, individualism, autonomy, and advantage, and [an] assum[ption of] instrumental rather
than normative and religious orientations to social action." Merry & Silbey, supra n. 21, at 177.
23. See Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-ConnectedMediation: What's Justice Got To Do
With It?, 79 Wash. U. L.Q. 787, 825 (2001).
24. See E. Allan Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social Psychology of ProceduralJustice 66-70, 205

(Plenum Press 1988).
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outcomes reached in dispute resolution processes" and their perceptions of the
legitimacy of the institution that provided or sponsored the dispute resolution
process. 26 The presence of four particular process elements result in heightened
perceptions
of procedural justice: the opportunity for disputants to express their
"voice,"27 assurance that a third party considered what they said,28 and treatment that
is both even-handed29 and dignified.3"
The study of tort litigants conducted by Professor Hensler and her colleagues
in three different state courts found that litigants perceived the non-consensual
processes of arbitration and trial as procedurally fairer than the consensual processes
of bilateral negotiation and judicial settlement conferences. 3 On its face, this might
suggest that disputants simply prefer processes in which neutral third parties make
the decisions. Indeed, as Professor Hensler notes, there are other studies that have
found explicitly that disputants prefer non-consensual processes.3 2 What these
studies do not say, however, is that disputants prefer non-consensual processes
simply because they prefer to transfer decision control to a third party. Instead, the
studies consistently indicate that disputants assume that they are more likely to
exercise process control-a meaningful opportunity for voice, real consideration,
even-handed and dignified treatment-if a third party is doing the listening and
making the decisions.33 Indeed, the tort litigants studied by Professor Hensler and

25. See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving
Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. & Society Rev. 11 (1984).
26.
See Lind & Tyler, supra n. 24, at 209; E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing and
Reactions to LegalAuthorities,in Everyday Practicesand Trouble Cases 188 (Austin Sarat et al. eds.,
Am. Bar Found. 1998).
27. See Lind& Tyler, supran. 24, at 101-04.
28. Id. at 236.
29. See Tom R. Tyler, PsychologicalModels ofthe Justice Motive: Antecedents of Distributiveand
ProceduralJustice, 67 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 850, 853 (1994).
30. See Lind & Tyler, supra n. 24, at 214.
31. See Lindetal.,supran. 6,at44-45.
32. See e.g. Stephen LaTour et al., Procedure:TransnationalPerspectivesand Preferences,86 Yale
L.J. 258,281 (1976) (finding that subjects in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and Hamburg, Germany, both
preferred procedures allowing "full opportunity for evidence presentation," but diverged with respect
to third-party decision control; Chapel Hill subjects preferred that the third party control the outcome
while Hamburg subjects did not); Pauline Houlden et al., Preferencefor Modes of Dispute Resolution
as a Function of Processand Decision Control, 14 J. Exper. Soc. Psychol. 13, 26 (1978) (finding that
all litigants and all third parties in the study preferred that the third party exercise high, rather than low,
decision control but also noting further that this preference was much stronger for third parties than for
litigants). But see Tom Tyler et al., Preferring,Choosing, and Evaluating Dispute Resolution
Procedures: The PsychologicalAntecedents of Feelings and Choices 28 (Am. Bar Found., Working
Paper No. 9304, 1993) (reporting that while people's post-procedure evaluations and preferences are
most strongly influenced by issues of "treatment," their actual selection among procedures is based on
issues of "control"); Kwok Leung, Some Determinantsof Reactions to ProceduralModels for Conflict
Resolution : A Cross-NationalStudy, 53 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 898, 903 (1987) (observing that
American subjects preferred mediation to the same degree as adversary procedure to resolve a dispute
arising out of a car accident).
33. See e.g. LaTour et al., supran. 32, at 274 (speculating that United States participants least prefer
bargaining because "if litigants simply present their cases to each other (as in bargaining), they may
choose to ignore each other or may prevent each other from making a complete presentation of the
evidence). See also Houlden et al., supra n. 32, at 26-27 (reporting that while litigants expressed a slight

JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2002, No. I

her colleagues clearly identified process characteristics-their perceptions of"dignity
and procedural care"" 4-as triggering the "perceived fairness advantage"" of the nonconsensual processes. These processes were preferred due to the process elements
which happened to accompany the role of the third party as decision maker-process
elements that were perceived as not accompanying the consensual processes that
were studied. 36
Further, the researchers in this study" and others have found that litigants'
perceptions of their decision control are related to, and perhaps even influenced by,
their assessments of the procedural justice furnished by dispute resolution
processes." This suggests that disputants use their perceptions of procedural justice
to judge the extent to which they have exercised or will exercise control over the
outcome.39 Variations in disputants' decision control, in contrast, do not appear to
have any or much influence upon disputants' procedural justice judgments.'

preference for high third-party decision control, apparently in recognition of "the need for third-party
intervention in order to assure a resolution of the dispute", litigants did not believe that high third-party
decision control would result in a fairer procedure and were most concerned "about the manner in which
information is presented"). Lind has theorized that people use a "fairness heuristic" and "form their
original justice judgment on the basis of procedures and social process and then later incorporate
outcome information into their overall impressions of the fairness or unfairness of the encounter. In the
terms of art used in modem social cognition theory, process information anchors the fairness judgment
to such an extent that outcome information can only make relatively minor adjustments." E. Allan Lind,
ProceduralJustice, Disputing,and Reactions to Legal Authorities, in Everyday Practicesand Trouble
Cases 177, 185 (Austin Sarat et al., eds., Northwestern U. Press & Am. Bar Assn. 1998).
34. Lind et al., supra n. 6, at 66.
35. Id.
36. It is worth recalling that disputants likely viewed bilateral negotiations and judicial settlement
conferences as less dignified and less procedurally careful in part because they were not invited to attend
these processes. Thus, the disputants could not observe whether their attorneys were given an
opportunity for voice, whether they received consideration, and whether the disputants' cases were
treated in an even-handed and dignified manner. See Lind et al., supra n. 6, at 74.
37. Lind et al., supra n. 7, at 972 ("Perceptions of control over the case outcome and the litigation
process were consistently related to procedural justice judgments ....We found that both decision and
process control were correlated with procedural justice and that both were correlated to about the same
degree... and that perceptions of control were as highly correlated with procedural justice in the context
of stranger-to-stranger disputes . . . as they were in disputes involving those who were previously
acquainted.").
38. Wissler, An Evaluation, supra n. 13, at viii (reporting that litigants were less likely to feel
pressured to accept settlements if their attorneys spent more time talking during mediation to present
their cases); Wissler, supra n. 1, at 345 n. 37 (reporting that litigants' perceptions of outcome control
were related to procedural judgments through their relationship with other process characteristics);
Wissler, Court-ConnectedMediation, supran. 13, at _ n. 229 (observing those litigants who reported
speaking more during mediation felt that they had more input in determining the outcome than litigants
who spoke less).
39. See Lind, supra n. 26, at 177, 185 (describing the "fairness heuristic").
40. See Lind & Tyler, supra n. 24, at 215; Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology ofProceduralJustice: A
Test of the Group-ValueModel, 57 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 830, 837 (1989). Indeed, some studies have
found no evidence that perceptions of decision control produce or influence perceptions of procedural
justice. See e.g. P. Christopher Early & E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice and Participationin Task
Selection: The Role of Control in MediatingJusticeJudgments, 52 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 1148, 1154
(1987). But see Tom R. Tyler, PsychologicalModels of the JusticeMotive: Antecedents ofDistributive
and ProceduralJustice, 67 J. Pers. & Soc. Psychol. 850, 859 (1994) (reporting studies' results finding
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These research results further emphasize the extent to which the locus of
decision control is less important to litigants' perceptions of procedural justice than
process elements-voice, consideration, even-handedness and dignity."' These
research results also support the need for the institutionalization of procedural justice
within allof the third party dispute resolution processes occurring within the courts,
regardless of whether the processes are categorized as consensual or nonconsensual. '2 This raises the obvious question: Is there anything that obligates the
courts to heed this call?
IV. THE TROUBLESOME APPLICATION OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS TO CONSENSUAL PROCESSES
The jurisprudence that has arisen out of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution is most likely to reveal the courts'
appreciation of the importance of procedural justice. Indeed, in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath,43 in which the plaintiffs alleged federal violation of
their rights to procedural due process, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter
acknowledged in his concurring opinion that the opportunity for voice has great
significance: "No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than to give
a person in jeopardy of a serious loss notice of the case against him and opportunity
to meet it. Nor has a better way beenfoundfor generatingthefeeling, so important
to a populargovernment, thatjustice has been done." It is important to note,
however, that Justice Frankfurter was examining the due process required before the
U.S. Attorney General could make a decision to designate an organization as
Communist and forward its name to the Loyalty Review Board of the United States.
When disputants are resolving their disputes consensually, in court-connected
mediation, do the courts continue to have an obligation "to generate the feeling..
that justice has been done"?
At aminimum, the procedural due process jurisprudence raises doubts regarding
the applicability of procedural due process to court-connected mediation and other
processes defined as "consensual." The Due Process Clauses of both the Fifth and

that "both decision and process control mattered" in the legal arena, while control did not matter in the
managerial setting).
41. See Houlden et al., supra n. 32, at 26.
42. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., A Community ofInterest in the Due Process Calculus,27 Hous. L. Rev.
635,636-37 (2000) ("The process whereby decisions are made reflects the community's commitment
to fundamental principles as surely as do the substantive outcomes of those decisions. Procedural due
process is thus acommunity imperative, and to approach it as atrade off between the community and
the community's individual members misconstrues the task.").
43. 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
44. Id. at 171-72 (emphasis added). Other judges have also recognized the importance of procedural
justice for court-connected processes. See e.g. Wayne D.Brazil, ComparingStructuresfor the Delivery
of ADR Services by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 Ohio St. J. on Dis. Res. 715, 727-28
(1999) (observing that "the primary concern of any court that sponsors an ADR program must be with
the process fairness of the services that are provided in that court's name").
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Fourteenth Amendments require "due process of law" before a person may be
"deprive[d]" of "life, liberty, or property."4' S Traditionally, the courts have
understood the Constitutional requirement of procedural due process as protecting
individual citizens from the wayward, arbitrary and binding power of the state to
Ironically, this may mean that the courts will perceive
work a deprivation.'
mediation as subject to procedural due process requirements only if the mediator
exceeds her authority and behaves in a coercive manner.47 At this point, the process
will transform from a consensual procedure into a non-consensual one and thus
trigger due process requirements, including the opportunity to be heard before a
decision is made, the right to an impartial decision-maker, and permission to retain
49
counsel.4 In contrast, if disputants attend and reach resolution in a mediation in
which there is no allegation that the court-connected mediator tried to impose her

45. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no "person ...shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
46. Justice Harlan, for example, observed in Boddie v. Connecticut:"[T]hose who wrote our original
Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those who drafted the Fourteenth Amendment,
recognized the centrality of the concept of due process in the operation of this system. Without this
guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process
of law, the State's monopoly over techniquesfor binding conflict resolution could hardly be said to be
acceptable under our scheme of things." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971) (emphasis
added).
47. Even Professor Richard Reuben, who has argued that court-connected ADR processes can and
should be understood as state action and thus subject to due process standards, acknowledges that the
consensual "nature" of mediation and the mediator's lack of "the coercive authority to decide cases.
. has the effect of limiting instances in which state action will be found in mediation, as well as
reducing the constitutional gravity exerted upon the mediator, although not completely eliminating it,
when state action is present." Richard C. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity: A Unitary Theory of
Alternative Dispute Resolution andPublic Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 949, 1049 (2000). Indeed,
most of Professor Reuben's examples of the application of due process requirements to mediation
involve such a change in the mediator's role. See id. at 1092-93. See also Richard C. Reuben, Public
Justice: Toward a State Action Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 577 (1997).
48. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (in determining whether a recipient of benefits had
received the required due process before his benefits were terminated, examined whether and how the
termination process provided the recipient with timely and adequate notice of a proposed termination,
an effective opportunity to defend by confronting adverse witnesses and presenting his own arguments
and evidence, permission to retain counsel, notice of the decision, reasoning and evidence relied upon,
and an impartial decision maker).
49. Certainly, class members have argued they have been denied due process of law when they have
not been notified of proposed settlements, have not been represented by independent counsel in the
settlement negotiations or have not been provided with an opportunity to object to the settlement terms.
See e.g. In re IntegraRealty Resources, Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1111 (10th Cir. 2001) (determining that
notice provided regarding settlement satisfied due process requirements); Romstadt v. Apple Computer,
Inc., 948 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (finding denial of due process as a result of failure to provide
class member with notice and an opportunity to be heard when a proposed settlement and related matters
were submitted to a Texas court for its consideration). See also Bowling v. Pfizer, 143 F.R.D. 141 (S.D.
Ohio 1992) (rejecting argument that class counsel and defendants were required to provide notice to
absent class members' counsel about settlement negotiations and to involve them in such negotiations).
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will,-' how can an alleged deprivation resulting from the mediation session be
viewed as anything other than self-imposed?5' And if the deprivation is selfimposed, what is the source of entitlement to the protections of procedural due
process? This analysis suggests that for disputants involved in consensual processes
such as mediation, there is no entitlement to the protections of procedural due
process-or to procedural justice. Although this issue deserves more extensive
treatment than is possible here, this discussion highlights the potential difficulty of
persuading courts that they are obligated to demand procedural justice from all
court-connected mediation.52
The awkwardness of expecting the courts to embrace the primacy of procedural
justice and, further, to require the uniform institutionalization of procedural justice
'
is also illuminated by examining the Supreme Court's "implicitly utilitarian"53
approach to procedural due process. In Matthews v. Eldridge,' the Supreme Court
established a test that balances three factors to determine the procedures that will
meet the requirements of procedural due process:

First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function

50. See e.g. Alan GuttmacherInst. v. McPherson,805 F.2d 1088,1094 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Kline
v. Wolf, 702 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985)) (observing that '"a court may not impose upon a plaintiff a
settlement that deprives him of relief to which he would be entitled after trial").
51. Professor Reuben notes the inapplicability of due process protections to the negotiation process

as follows:
Finally, outside the purview of government power is the process of negotiation between and among
private parties. Like a nebula seen throughout the solar system of dispute resolution, negotiation
has more of a pervasive presence that is part of and influences all of the other processes. Here there
is no constitutional power because there is no government actor exerting coercive authority, only
private parties and their agents talking and negotiating among themselves, albeit in the shadow of
the law.
Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity supra n. 47, at 1049-50.
52. In Peraginev. Maimone, a plaintiffalleged that he had been deprived of his civil rights and due
process of law when he settled his claim due to alleged misrepresentations by the defendants. Peragine
v. Maimone, 504 F. Supp. 136 (D.C.N.Y. 1980). A judge who had been involved in a settlement
conference was among the defendants. Id. at 38-39. The court determined that the plaintiff's claims
were "devoid of merit and wholly insubstantial," observing that defendant-attorneys could not be
considered to be state officers and that the defendant-judges were protected by absolute judicial
immunity. Id. But see McGrath, 341 U.S. at 173-74 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Due process is not
confined in its scope to the particular forms in which rights have heretofore been found to have been
curtailed for want ofprocedural fairness. Due process is perhaps the most majestic concept in our whole
constitutional system. While it contains the garnered wisdom of the past in assuring fundamental justice,
it is also a living principle not confined to past instances.").
53. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue Process Calculusfor AdministrativeAdjudication
in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 46-48
(1976).
54. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.'.
In this and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the goal
of the Matthews test is a narrow one--to insure that a decision-maker renders a
reasonably accurate and just decision.s' When, for example, the Court has not been
persuaded that the substantive result in a case would have been different with the
addition or substitution of proposed procedural safeguards, the Court has found no
violation of procedural due process."
Thus, the Court intimates that procedural due process matters only to the extent
that it can be shown that it would change the substantive outcome. 8 Clearly missing
from the Supreme Court's analysis 9 is an understanding of the inherent value of
procedural justice that is separate from its instrumental effect on the outcomes 'in
particular cases.' It appears that there is no judicial recognition of the research that
has demonstrated the effects of procedural due process upon individual litigants'

55. Id. at 335.
56. See id. at 343-44 ("An additional factor to be considered here is the fairness and reliability of
the existing pre-termination procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional procedural
safeguards .... [P]rocedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding
process as applied to the generality of cases, not the rare exceptions."). See also Lassiterv. Department
of Social Services of Durham County, North Carolina,452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) ("accuracy"); Jerry L.
Mashaw, The Supreme Court'sDue ProcessCalculus,44 U. Chi. L. Rev. 28, 48 (1976) ("The Eldridge
Court conceives of the values of procedures too narrowly: it views the sole purpose of procedural
protections as enhancing accuracy, and thus limits its calculus to the benefits or costs that flow from
correct or incorrect decisions.").
57. See e.g. Matthews, 424 U.S. 319 (finding that termination decision could be made based on a
written "medical assessment of the worker's physical or mental condition" and thus the "potential value
of an evidentiary hearing, or even oral presentation to the decisionmaker, is substantially less ... than
in Goldberg"); Lassiter,452 U.S. at 32-33 (In deciding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not entitle an indigent mother to state-provided counsel at a hearing for the termination
of her parental rights, the Court observed: "While hearsay evidence was no doubt admitted, and while
Ms. Lassiter no doubt left incomplete her defense that the Department had not adequately assisted her
in rekindling her interest in her son, the weight of the evidence that she had few sparks of such an
interest was sufficiently great that the presence of counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a
determinativedifference.") (emphasis added). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694
(1984) (The Court established a two-part test for determining when ineffective representation required
reversal of conviction. In order to show prejudice to the defense that constitutes ineffective assistance
under the Constitution, a client must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result ofthe proceedingwould have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.") (emphasis added).
58. See also Frank H. Easterbrook, Substanceand Due Process, 1982 Sup. Ct. Rev. 85, 110 (Philip
B. Kurland et al. eds., 1983) ("The goal of due process is to hold as low as possible the sum of two costs:
the costs created by erroneous decisions, including false positives and false negatives, and the cost of
administering the procedures.").
59. It should be noted that lower courts have sometimes voiced concerns about the Supreme Court's
approach. See e.g. People v. Ramirez, 599 P.2d 622, 626 (1979) ("federal approach... undervalues the
important due process interest in recognizing the dignity and worth of the individual by treating him as
an equal, fully functioning member of society").
60. See Mashaw, supra n. 53, at 28-30, 46-59.
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dignity, its influence upon perceptions of substantive justice and its significance in
sustaining public perceptions of the legitimacy of the courts.
Indeed, using the lens of procedural due process jurisprudence, mediation may
be viewed as relieving the courts of the obligation to deliver either substantive or
procedural justice. When the disputants in civil actions reach their own settlements
through mediation, they release the courts from the obligation to reach decisions that
meet a standard of substantive justice. And if the courts understand procedural due
process as relevant only to the extent that it affects the substantivejustice of courtimposedoutcomes, the disputants' control oftheir settlements also releases the courts
from the obligation to provide dispute resolution processes that meet a standard of
procedural justice.
V. CONCLUSION
Where does this leave us? The limited research currently available suggests that
vesting decision control in the disputants does not guarantee that they will perceive
such control as meaningful or as a significant protection from injustice. Process
elements-voice, consideration, even-handed and dignified treatment-do reliably
signal procedural justice for disputants, and despite current due process
jurisprudence, it is clear from the research that procedural justice is much more than
a means to a substantively just end. The research strongly suggests that procedural
justice considerations should underlie all of the third party processes that are
institutionalized within the courts, regardless of whether those processes are
consensual or non-consensual. Thus, the institutionalization ofprocedural justice in
mediation, rather than the abandonment of this consensual process in favor of nonconsensual processes such as court-connected arbitration, will respond more
accurately to the preferences of disputants and do more to insure the legitimacy and
social stature of the courts while also facilitating settlements.
The disputant-centered, participatory model of mediation that arose during the
contemporary mediation movement may indeed have "offered a means to import
procedural justice into the often-invisible yet ubiquitous settlement"'" of cases that
now dominates civil litigation. As T.S. Eliot observed more than seventy-five years
ago, however:
Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow 62

61. Welsh, supran.2, at 16.
62. T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men in The CompletePoems and Plays1909-1950 56,58 (Harcourt Brace
1958).
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The challenge presented today is to persuade the courts (and even disputants)
that procedural justice should be as much a part of consensual processes in which a
third party facilitates communication and resolution, as ofnon-consensual processes
which involve the imposition of a decision by the third party. Will the results of
research be enough to move the courts to require procedural justice in consensual
processes, especially when alleged violations of procedure can themselves provide
fertile ground for new litigation? Ultimately, this Comment can do no more than
acknowledge the difficulties presented by due process jurisprudence and suggest that
success in establishing procedural justice will do much to determine whether the
effect of institutionalizing mediation in the courts is marked "with a bang [or] but a
63
'

whimper. 9

63.

Id. at 59.

